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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as a part of the MSc in Communications and Cybersecurity 
at the International Hellenic University.  
This work will try to address one of the main issues that modern botmasters face, 
which is the takedown of their Command and Control infrastructure. After establishing 
the scope of the problem, we will propose our solution. 
 
 
Mengidis Anagnostis 
7/12/2018 
 
 
  -v- 
Contents 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................. III 
CONTENTS ................................................................................................................... V 
1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 BOTS AND BOTNETS .......................................................................................... 1 
1.2 AIM OF THIS DISSERTATION ............................................................................... 2 
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THIS DISSERTATION ................................................................. 2 
2 FUNDAMENTALS ABOUT BOTNETS................................................................ 5 
2.1 BOTNET HISTORY .............................................................................................. 5 
2.2 BOTNET LIFE CYCLE .......................................................................................... 6 
2.3 ARCHITECTURAL DESIGNS ................................................................................. 8 
2.3.1 Centralized C&C .................................................................................. 8 
2.3.2 Decentralized C&C ............................................................................. 9 
2.3.3 P2P C&C ............................................................................................ 10 
2.4 BOTMASTER CHALLENGES .............................................................................. 12 
2.4.1 Sinkholing ........................................................................................... 12 
2.4.2 P2P Polluting ..................................................................................... 13 
2.4.3 C&C Takedown ................................................................................. 14 
3 BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY .......................................................................... 15 
3.1 BLOCKCHAIN DEFINITION ................................................................................. 15 
3.2 HOW BITCOIN WORKS ..................................................................................... 16 
3.2.1 Addresses and Transactions ........................................................... 17 
3.2.2 Block Propagation in Bitcoin Network ............................................ 20 
3.3 HOW ZOMBIECOIN USED BITCOIN’S NETWORK .............................................. 21 
3.4 WHAT IS MONERO ............................................................................................ 21 
3.4.1 Addresses and Transactions ........................................................... 22 
3.4.2 Disadvantages of Bitcoin as a C&C Communication Channel .. 26 
-vi- 
4 MONERO AS A SOLUTION ............................................................................... 29 
4.1 OPERATION OF OUR PROPOSED BOT ............................................................. 29 
4.2 TESTING ENVIRONMENT .................................................................................. 31 
4.3 SENDING COMMANDS ...................................................................................... 32 
4.4 PROOF OF CONCEPT ....................................................................................... 34 
4.5 COST OF OPERATION ...................................................................................... 39 
5 CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................... 41 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................... 43 
 
 
  -1- 
1 Introduction 
Over the last decades, the undeniable evolution of technology, has offered innumerable 
positive effects for the society. However, as our world becomes increasingly intercon-
nected, the emergence of online threats is an unavoidable side effect which needs to be 
addressed. 
Internet threats have become a hot topic of discussion during the last past years and 
despite their short-lived history, they are undergoing an impressive transformation from 
being a threat which solely aims to disrupt the regular function of infrastructure, to a 
threat that also targets organizations and people. This leads to an unprecedented versatil-
ity of threats makes the Internet an excellent medium for cyber criminals which in turn 
transforms the cyberspace into a de facto theater of war. It gives the opportunity of ac-
cessing billions of interconnected devices at almost real-time without having to rely on 
means of interference such as physical presence or physical access. Additionally, the an-
onymity that internet offers, allows bad actors to disguise their origin and their motives, 
which places them in a position to orchestrate large-scale attacks without worrying about 
facing the consequences or sometimes realized the impact of their attacks since they are 
so detached from their targets. 
 One of the most common goals of any cyber-attack is gaining access to a remote sys-
tem, thus performing tasks that in any other case could only be possible for the system’s 
user. Depending on the sophistication of the attack, it is possible for the attacker to even 
escalate that user’s privileges and gain escalated permissions, equal to these of a system’s 
administrator, which can be later used to steal sensitive data, disrupt normal operation 
and hinder those system’s usual workflow. 
 
1.1 Bots and Botnets 
 
Instead of manually controlling compromised systems, bad actors commonly install mal-
ware on the victim’s system so that they are able to autonomously perform actions based 
on predefined commands by the attacker. This approach mainly aims at increasing the 
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number of infected hosts, thus increasing cyber criminal’s capabilities, by automating the 
process of spreading over networks, removable storage devices or even email attach-
ments. The biggest drawback of this classic approach is that as soon as the malware starts 
spreading, the attacker can no longer interfere with it, update the payload in case a bug is 
found or make any changes in the malware’s predefined list of malicious activities. 
 In order to avoid these shortcomings, malware authors came up with the idea of im-
plementing communication channels that will allow them to communicate directly with 
the infected systems, therefore allowing them to issue commands on demand without 
having to rely on beforehand programmed script of actions. This generation of malware 
are called Bots, derived from word robot, the network of compromised hosts is called a 
Botnet and the operator who issues the commands and usually owns the botnet is called 
Botmaster.  
 
1.2 Aim of this Dissertation 
 
 
In this dissertation, we will try to present a novel idea of a blockchain-based Command 
and Control (C&C) mechanism that can be potentially very difficult to countermeasure. 
It is our belief that despite the numerous advantages of blockchain technology, it can also 
be a very powerful tool in the hands of malware authors that will allow them to develop 
the next generation of botnets. As far as we know, there has been only one work similar 
to this dissertation and our aim is to keep the main idea and propose an even more resilient 
C&C mechanism. 
 
1.3 Objectives of this Dissertation 
 
We will first establish a base on what are botnets, their typical lifecycle, the past and 
current mechanisms utilized by them, and what are the most common countermeasures 
against them.  
In the third chapter we will analyze how blockchain works and present Zombiecoin, 
a botnet-related research that used Bitcoin’s network for relaying commands. We will 
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then proceed to examine Monero as an alternative blockchain platform which mainly fo-
cuses in anonymity and privacy. 
In the fourth chapter we will examine how realistic is to use Monero’s blockchain as 
a communication channel for a botnet and create a proof of concept.   
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2 Fundamentals about Botnets 
In this chapter we will attempt to demystify the way botnets work and examine the dif-
ferent methods used by malware authors to communicate with the attacker along with 
some of the most commonly used techniques utilized by them in order to avoid detection. 
Furthermore, we will try examining from a botmaster’s perspective, the challenges that 
he has to face in order to avoid the takedown of his botnet. 
2.1 Botnet History 
Similar to their predecessors, namely viruses and worms, bots are using similar methods 
in order to self-propagate. These methods resemble a lot those of other classes of malware 
and typically include the exploitation of vulnerabilities in the software [1], trojan injection 
[2] and the use of social engineering [3]. 
 Historically, botnets originated from IRC which stands for Internet Relay Chat and is 
a chat system based on text. The concept of the first bots was perceived due to the need 
to interpret simple commands given by the chat users and help chat rooms administrators 
retrieve information about emails and aliases. The first recorded IRC-based bot, released 
in 1993, was Eggdrop [4] and its development continues until today. Eggdrop has triggered 
the development of other bots but this time these bots were created for the primary pur-
pose of attacking other IRC users or other servers. Consequently, bots began having new 
features implemented, such as Denial of Service (DOS) and Distributed Denial of Service 
shortly after [5]. 
 That lead to the evolution of bots which began using complex communication mech-
anisms, integrate powerful attack methods and updating in a very fast pace, exploiting 
even zero-day vulnerabilities. Examples of such bots are SDBot [6] and Agobot [7]. The 
latter is considered by many as the turning point for the botnet ecosystem since at that 
point, no one considered botnets as a major threat to the Internet [8]. 
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Table 1 
  
The latest generation of botnets have become even more sophisticated and can now 
propagate through file sharing, P2P networks and drive-by downloads in websites. In Ta-
ble 1, we list some of the more well-known bots along with their main characteristics. 
   
2.2 Botnet Life Cycle 
 
A typical life-cycle of a botnet has five phases which includes the initial infection, the 
secondary injection, establishing a connection, the C&C and finally the update and 
maintenance of the botnet. Literature sometimes uses different terms of all the different 
phases, but generally a typical botnet life cycle is as shown in Figure 1. 
 During the first phase, the Initial Infection, the host is infected and becomes a poten-
tial zombie which is another commonly used term for bots. In this phase, typical infection 
methods are used, like exploiting vulnerabilities in the operating system, infected down-
loads from webpages, infected email attachments or automatically executed scripts in 
USB removable devices [20, 21]. 
 During the second phase, the payload is being injected to the host, usually down-
loaded by a list on network addresses, contained in the bot which infected the host during 
the initial stage. These addresses can vary from a list of IP addresses to a list of domain 
names. Even though this increases the resilience of the botnet to take down attempts, at 
Name Year Architecture Protocol Infection Reference 
Eggdrop 1993 Centralized IRC None [4] 
GTbot 1998 Centralized IRC None [9] 
SDbot 2002 Centralized IRC PE Injection [10] 
Agobot 2002 Centralized IRC MS03-026 exploit [11] 
Kraken 2006 Centralized UDP,TCP Social Engineering [12] 
Rustock 2006 P2P HTTP Spam email [13] 
Storm 2006 P2P UDP+ / eDonkey Spam email and Social En-
gineering 
[14] 
Conficker 2008 Centralized HTTP MS08-067 exploit [15] 
Conficker C 2009 P2P TCP, UDP MS08-067 exploit, NET-
BIOS 
[16] 
Festi 2010 Centralized HTTP Spam email [17] 
TDL-4 2011 P2P Kad Network MS10-092 exploit [18] 
Zeus 2011 P2P UDP, TCP, HTTP Spam email [19] 
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the same time it creates a single point of failure, something that will be examined later in 
this dissertation. As soon as the payload is downloaded and executed, the host starts be-
having as a bot and becomes part of the botnet. The payload is usually downloaded 
through HTTP, FTP or P2P network protocols. 
 
Figure 1 
 
 The third phase of the infection is probably the most critical one, since the initial 
connection to the C&C server is established in order to receive updates or new instruc-
tions. Some authors mention this phase as Rallying [22], however the process remains the 
same and is usually performed each time the host is restarted to ensure that has the latest 
version of the payload and report back to the C&C server that it is still part of the botnet 
and it is ready to receive new commands. Evidently, in a typical bot life cycle, this phase 
will be repeatedly executed numerous times [23]. Some researchers tend to merge the sec-
ond and third phase into one because they are close related. There are many bots that use 
the C&C server as a file server for the payload too, hence the two phases are more likely 
to happen simultaneously. 
 The last phase is the update and maintenance of the botnet. Most botmasters have to 
update the payload in order to continue avoid detection by antivirus software, apply new 
features that the malware author implemented or even switch C&C server to obfuscate 
the footprint that their botnet leaves behind. Previous work has shown that the last change 
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can be observed by monitoring an increase in DNS queries  performed by all hosts in a 
very short amount of time [24]. 
 
2.3 Architectural Designs 
  
As mentioned previously, what distinguishes botnets from other types of malware, is the 
use of C&C channels which make possible for the botmaster to update and direct them. 
These channels can be operated through a variety of network topologies and use different 
transport layers such as TCP or UDP. A simplistic view of a botnet can be seen in Figure 
2. 
 
Figure 2 
As seen in Table 1, depending on their C&C architecture, botnets can be classified as 
Centralized, Decentralized and P2P.  
 
2.3.1 Centralized C&C 
 
The centralized C&C architecture shares a lot of similarities with the classic server-client 
network model, as shown in Figure 3. Examples of such architecture are botnets that rely 
on IRC protocol due to IRC’s server-centric nature and HTTP based.  
In the case of IRC, the owner of the botnet has to create IRC channels on the C&C 
server where bots idle until a new command arrives. IRC protocol was very popular dur-
ing the past, as indicated by the report issued by Symantec in 2010, which indicated that 
more than 30% of the botnets used IRC as their communication protocol.  
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Figure 3 
 However, due to the reason that it is considered good practice for network adminis-
trators to block IRC traffic [25], the HTTP protocol became a more popular option for 
C&C communication. The biggest advantage that HTTP protocol offers is that ports 80 
and 8080 are permitted in almost every network and the only for network administrators 
to distinguish botnet traffic from usual web traffic is by using IDS or some packet sniffer 
and perform traffic analysis.  
The centralized kind of architecture offers low latency and easier coordination of the 
botnet in such a way that enables easier monitoring by the botmaster. Additionally, it is 
much simpler to maintain such a network and the deployment time of a single server is 
significantly smaller than the architectures presented below. 
 
2.3.2  Decentralized C&C 
 
Even though centralized C&C architecture offers great manageability due to its straight-
forward design, it is also the botnet’s single point of failure. In case someone takes down 
or denying access to the C&C server will automatically render the botnet useless. 
 This weakness led to the development of the next generation botnets where they tried 
to maintain the efficiency of the centralized model as much as possible but improve its 
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resilience against takedowns. This was accomplished by adding redundant C&C servers 
which are contacted either sequentially or using round-robin [26]. This topology is shown 
in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4 
Some more advanced botnets are using Domain Registration Algorithms which al-
lows the botmaster to register many domains ahead of time that will be used by the C&C 
servers in the future. However, since the algorithm that creates these domains is usually 
hard-coded in the payload, it is possible through reverse engineering to identify which 
domains are going to be registered. Consequently, a defender can register them before the 
botmaster and hijack the botnet. 
 
2.3.3 P2P C&C   
 
The most recent generation of botnets adopts a more random architecture in order to avoid 
the disarticulation of the network even when a C&C server is taken down. Such architec-
ture is based on a variety of P2P protocols and a typical topology of such botnet is illus-
trated in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5 
According to Jelacity and Bilicki [27], depending on the overlay used, they can be classi-
fied as follows: 
• Unstructured P2P Overlays: This overlay network contains random topologies 
such as uniform random or power-law networks. They do not support features like 
routing or flooding. 
• Superpeer Overlays: In this type of networks, some peers are randomly selected 
to play the role of temporary servers. These peers are called superpeers and are 
used my popular applications like Skype [28]. 
• Structured P2P Overlays: These networks create a mapping of the network based 
on a Distributed Hash Table (DHT). Most recent botnets use this type of structure 
and more specifically the Kademlia DHT [29]. 
In P2P botnets, after the initial infection takes place, bots are searching the network to 
find other peers to connect to, so that they integrate to the rest of the botnet. This proce-
dure is called bootstrap and is considered the weakest point of such botnets, mainly be-
cause the discovery of the initial peer list compromises the rate at which the network can 
grow [30]. 
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2.4 Botmaster Challenges 
 
Even though preventing new hosts from being infected slows down the growth of an ac-
tive botnet, the hosts that are already infected are not affected directly. Therefore, the bots 
are still operating regularly and perform the malicious activities that their botmaster in-
structs them to. To cope with these botnets, various techniques have been proposed, some 
of which have already proven effective in mitigating a botnet’s operation.  
2.4.1 Sinkholing 
 
When it comes to mitigating botnets, one major challenge is to observe the communica-
tion of the infected machines in the first place. Since logging the communication of all 
infected machines is close to impossible, observing the communication of the C&C server 
is a more realistic approach. Nevertheless, this approach will not always be possible since 
most of the times the C&C server is beyond the scope of influence of the defending or-
ganization. 
 This problem can be alleviated through what is known as DNS-based sinkholing. This 
method can be applied to any botnet that uses fixed domain names, with or without fast 
fluxing, and basically takes advantage of the fact that every bot needs a DNS server to 
resolve the IP address of the C&C server that it tries to communicate with. In a controlled 
network like a corporate LAN, the local nameserver is configured is such a way that the 
domain of the actual C&C server will be redirected to the IP address of the sinkhole 
server, thus exposing the IP addresses of all the infected machines. 
 If the bot uses domain fluxing [31], sinkholing technique can also be applied to envi-
ronments beyond the control of the defender or even the whole Internet. When using do-
main fluxing, each bot generates a list of domains that are possible candidates for the 
C&C server.  
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Figure 6 
Usually these generated domain names are using a similar seed with respect to something 
like the current date or timestamp. In case a domain cannot be resolved, the infected host 
continues to the next generated domain until a C&C server responds. As a result, if some-
one reverse engineers a bot sample, he can generate the list of all possible domains, reg-
ister them before the botmaster and redirect the traffic to the sinkhole server. 
In the case of P2P botnets, since domain names are not used, we can apply the sybil-
attack method. Based on a metric defined by the developer of the bot, each bot knows 
about a subnet of other bots, usually the ones with the smaller routing distance. This can 
be exploited by deploying a number of fake peers which will route all the messages in-
tended for the C&C to the sinkhole server, as demonstrated by [14]. 
2.4.2 P2P Polluting 
 
Aside from sybil-attacks, P2P based botnets are also susceptible to a technique called P2P 
polluting. A P2P network’s peers do not know about every other single peer and only 
carry a limited list of them. This can be exploited by deploying a number of fake peers to 
the already existing peers of the botnet. Even though this sounds similar to the sybil-
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attack, the main difference lies in the fact that in this case the peers are not real, and they 
are just used to fill the list of the actual ones. 
 By overwriting all the legit entries in the aforementioned list with fake peers, we 
manage to propagate all these fake entries to the rest of the botnet which slowly begins to 
fork from the rest of the network. Consequentially, if no bot is able to communicate with 
the other, no messages will be relayed, thus the connection with the C&C server will be 
lost. 
 Some malware authors however came with a countermeasure, where they try to probe 
the peers before adding them to the peer list. If the peer responds then and only then it is 
added to the list, otherwise it is being discarded as a fake one.     
2.4.3 C&C Takedown   
 
The most classic countermeasure towards existing botnets, is the takedown of their C&C 
server. If someone analyzes a malware sample, it is possible to retrieve the address of the 
server that plays the role of the C&C. Through IP lookup or reverse lookup, the organi-
zation that owns the specific IP can be found and the server can be disconnected or shut 
down.   
 Depending on the legislation that applies to the organization, the law enforcement 
agencies can issue a demand to the Internet Service Provider to cease the connectivity to 
the specific server. As soon as the C&C server loses its connectivity to the internet, the 
botmasters can no longer issue new commands, therefore the botnet will continue follow-
ing the instructions that were already given to it but since it will no longer be able to 
update, it will eventually remain dormant. Such an example is the takedown of the 
Rustock botnet which was a combined effort by Microsoft Digital Crimes Unit, the U.S. 
Marshals Service and the U.S. District Court [32]. 
 Even though these takedowns sound relatively easy for any organization located in a 
developed nation, the use of bulletproof hosting [33] by the botmasters makes the takedown 
a much harder procedure. 
  
 
 
15 
 
3 Blockchain Technology  
Cryptocurrencies became popular due to the surprising and quick rise of Bitcoin which 
showed an unprecedented growth during the last couple of years. As of January 2017, 
more than 1000 cryptocurrencies are in circulation even though most of them are either 
abandoned by their developers or their trading volume is practically non-existent. Argu-
ably however, the biggest innovation that cryptocurrencies introduced was the utilization 
of blockchain as a distributed database.  
 
3.1 Blockchain Definition 
 
The idea of cryptocurrencies was first perceived by David Chaum in his proposal for 
untraceable payments [34] where he described a system where third-parties are unable to 
determine payees and time or amount of payments made by an individual. He took his 
idea one step further in 1990 by creating the first cryptographic anonymous electronic 
cash system, known as ecash [35]. Later in 90s, a lot of startups emerged trying to imple-
ment electronic cash protocols, attempts that ultimately failed. 
Cryptocurrencies, as we know them today, are peer-to-peer decentralized digital 
assets based on the principles of cryptography. Most cryptocurrencies use a distributed 
database as the pillar of their system, known as Blockchain, which allows them to use it 
as a distributed public ledger without having to rely to any form of centralized control 
similar to banking systems.   
 The blockchain is the equivalent of a book maintained by a bank which contains all 
the accounts and each transaction made. Of course, this is an oversimplification and in 
reality, there are many differences, possibly the most noticeable being the fact the bank’s 
records are private whereas the blockchain is publicly available and easily accessible by 
everyone. One of the most interesting aspects of blockchains is that they contain the rec-
ords of every transaction made since the beginning, also known as genesis block, by using 
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a peer-to-peer distributed timestamp server which generates computational proof of the 
chronological order of the transactions [36] 
 
3.2 How Bitcoin Works 
 
Bitcoin (BTC) is the first widely used cryptocurrency and as of today, remains the most 
widely adopted one. It was created in 2008, when pseudonymous Satoshi Nakamoto 
posted a paper [36], describing a system for trustless electronic transactions. In 2009, the 
first open source bitcoin client was released with Nakamoto mining the genesis block. In 
2011, Satoshi Nakamoto distanced himself from the Bitcoin project claiming that it is in 
good hands [37] and until today his true identity has not been revealed.  
 In order for someone to use Bitcoin, first he has to connect to the Bitcoin network 
using one of the available clients. Despite the fact that our analysis is client-agnostic, we 
will use the Bitcoin core client as an example template because its source code has been 
heavily audited due to its open source nature. 
 By default, each client establishes a connection to eight other clients and start ex-
changing different types of information such as their current state, the block height, the 
transactions that have been relayed to them, cryptographic signatures, etc. Communica-
tion is carried out over a peer-to-peer network which topology is completely random even 
though each client maintains a local copy of potential addresses to perform initial con-
nections to. In case it is the client’s first ever attempted connection, thus no local list of 
peers exists, then the client uses one of the source code’s hardcoded seed nodes. For the 
rest of his lifecycle, the client tries to maintain 8 outgoing connections, while at the same 
time accepts incoming connections from other nodes which are capped to 125 simultane-
ous connections. The information exchanged between two nodes is propagated through 
the entire network, an action necessary, as we will later see, for the validation of the 
transactions by the network. 
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3.2.1 Addresses and Transactions 
 
As mentioned before, the core of the Bitcoin network is the blockchain that contains the 
balance of every Bitcoin user at any given time. However, instead of associating names 
with accounts, Bitcoin identifies its users by Bitcoin addresses.  
 A Bitcoin account is basically a public/private ECDSA (specifically secp256k1 [38]) 
keypair and a Bitcoin address is a 160-bit hash of the public portion of that keypair. The 
algorithms used for this one-way conversion are SHA256 and RIPEMD160 [39]: 
 
A = RIPEMD160 (SHA256 (Pk)) 
 
Where A is the calculated Bitcoin address and Pk is the public key 
When someone wishes to send Bitcoins from one account to another, he issues a 
transaction. This transaction is created by signing a hash of the transaction through which 
the Bitcoins were originated. Given that in Bitcoin there is one-to-one correspondence 
between public keys and addresses, a transaction between two addresses as and ar has the 
following form [40]: 
 
T(aS→aR) = {source, B, aR, SIGskas (source, B, aR)} 
 
Where SIGskas is the signature which is using the signer’s private key skas corre-
sponding to the public key of address as, B the amount of Bitcoins and source is a refer-
ence to the transaction (the most recent one) that as acquired the Bitcoins from. Appar-
ently, since everyone knows the public key of as, the validity of this signature can be 
independently verified by anyone.  
In Bitcoin terms, spending is basically transferring value from a previous transac-
tion, called transaction input, to a transaction output. A transaction input is where the 
Bitcoins are coming from and the transaction output declares a new owner for these 
Bitcoins by associating them with a key, called encumbrance. This output can then be 
used as an input for another transaction, hence a chain of ownership is created.  
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                Figure 7 - A chain of transactions where the output of one transaction is the input for 
another 
 
Transactions, in their most common form, have one input and one output. Since 
the value of an input cannot always match the exact value of an output, sometimes a new 
output is created which contains some change returning to the sending address. 
 
 
Figure 8: Common form of a bitcoin transaction with one input and one output 
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Another commonly used type of transaction is the one that combines multiple in-
puts into a single output. If we consider the previous example, the change received by 
multiple payments will result in multiple new smaller inputs, which will eventually have 
to be aggregated in one single output. 
 
 
Figure 9: Combination of multiple inputs to one output 
 
Finally, one last form of transactions often seen on Bitcoin’s blockchain is a trans-
action that splits one input to N outputs which represent multiple Bitcoin adresses. It is 
commonly used by mining pools to distribute earnings among miners or business entities 
to process their payroll. 
 
 
Figure 10: Common form of a transaction distributing funds across multiple outputs 
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3.2.2 Block Propagation in Bitcoin Network 
 
When a transaction is transmitted to the network, it is then subjected to validity 
checks and it is not verified until it becomes part of the blockchain. New transactions 
constantly flow in the network and they get added to a memory pool of unconfirmed 
transactions handled by each node. Since the size of each block is finite, transactions have 
to deal with competition in order to be added in the new block and the selection criteria 
is based on who paid the highest fee.  
As nodes build a new block, they add unconfirmed transactions from the memory 
pool to a new block and attempt to solve a computationally intensive problem to prove 
that the block is valid. This is the proof-of-work concept of Bitcoin and the process of 
solving it is called mining. Mining ensures that transactions are only confirmed if enough 
computational effort was spent on the blocks that contain them. More blocks mean more 
effort which subsequently means more trust [39]. 
 To incentivize mining, each mining node includes a special transaction in its block 
containing a transaction that pays its own address a reward (currently 12.5 BTC per block) 
of newly created Bitcoins. If the node finds the solution before the other nodes in the 
network, then the block becomes valid, and it wins the reward since the block is added to 
the blockchain, thus the reward transaction becomes spendable. This reward transaction 
is the only exception to the rule that a transaction’s outputs has to be smaller or equal to 
its inputs. 
 The block is then propagated throughout the network and contains a list of transac-
tions that the node which created the block committed since the previous block [41]. To 
prevent denial-of-service attacks and spam, every node that receives this newly created 
block validates it before forwarding it further. If it determines that it is a valid block then 
it propagates it to its adjacent nodes, discards its previous mining efforts, applies the 
transactions from the current block and immediately starts working on building the next 
block.  
 At this point, the network has agreed on the validity of the transactions contained in 
the newly mined block and the transactions are confirmed and do not have to be reapplied. 
The transactions that were not included will have to be validated again and reapplied on 
top of the new block state. 
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3.3 How Zombiecoin Used Bitcoin’s Network 
 
The first work that proposed the use of a publicly available infrastructure and overlay a 
C&C communication channel on top of it, was Nappa et al. [42] who basically suggested 
a C&C channel overlaid on the Skype network. However, contrary to Bitcoin, Skype 
doesn’t offer a decentralized environment, it is closed source and since its acquisition by 
Microsoft in 2011, Skype switched to a cloud based architecture [43].  
 S.T. Ali et al. [44] proposed a scheme which offered considerable advantages over 
existing C&C architectures and used the Bitcoin network as a leverage for communica-
tion. The comparative advantage of Zombiecoin, as the authors named the proposed bot, 
is multifactorial, however it can be summed up to the following. 
 First of all, it eliminates the need for botmasters to maintain complex and custom 
C&C networks. This allows them to be spared the cost, the hassle and more importantly 
the increased risk that is inherent in large scale botnet networks. Second, the authors of 
Zombiecoin, arguably claim that the Bitcoin network offers anonymity especially if com-
bined with Tor and VPNs.  
 As a final advantage, the study reports the fact that the Bitcoin network is resilient to 
takedown attempts and any form of regulation, claims that will be further examined in 
this study. 
 
3.4 What is Monero 
 
Monero (XMR) is an open source cryptocurrency created in 2014 which primarily focuses 
on privacy, fungibility and scalability. One of the reasons that makes Monero unique is 
that unlike many other cryptocurrencies, it doesn’t share a common codebase with Bitcoin 
but instead it is based on Cryptonote protocol [45], albeit with several modifications. 
 Monero gained publicity when, in August 2016, two of the largest darknet markets 
started accepting it [46], resulting in a 20x spike in its value. It also spiked interest of 
several Bitcoin maximalists and developers due to its strong focus on scalability, an issue 
plaguing Bitcoin. 
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Little improvements over the Bitcoin network protocol abound in Monero. It is still a 
peer-to-peer cryptocurrency implementing a random network topology based on con-
stantly updating node lists. One difference between the two clients is that there is no hard 
cap in Monero’s client regarding maximum number of outgoing connections. Instead, it 
implements a configurable bandwidth limit on ingress and egress traffic. 
 
3.4.1 Addresses and Transactions 
 
Monero’s public addresses are quite different compared to Bitcoin. More specifically 
Monero makes use of two keypairs, the view keypair and the spend keypair. Contrary to 
Bitcoin, the view and spend keypairs are EdDSA [47] (specifically ed25519). The private 
spend key and the private view key are passed through the ed25519 scalar function to 
create their public counterparts.  
To derive the public address from these keys, the following transformations hap-
pen: 
 
1. One network byte is appended at the beginning of the pair of public keys resulting 
in a 65-byte string.  
2. These 65 bytes are hashed with Keccak-256 
3. The first four bytes from the hashed value are prepended to the 65-byte value of 
step 1, resulting in a 69-byte public address. 
4. The 69-byte string is divided into 8-byte blocks which are separately converted to 
Base58, creating a 95-character string which is the Monero public address. 
 
The transaction structure of Monero remains similar to Bitcoin in its basis, where the 
client selects several incoming transactions (inputs), signs them with his private key and 
sends them to the recipient. However, contrary to Bitcoin’s model, where each user has a 
unique public and private key, Monero implements stealth addresses which basically re-
quire from the sender to create random addresses on behalf of the recipient, bound to be 
used only once. This way the recipient can publish his address, albeit have all his incom-
ing transactions go to unique addresses in the blockchain without publicly revealing his 
transactions.  
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Figure 11: The keys/transaction model of Cryptonote 
 
In a typical Monero transaction the sender performs a Diffie-Hellman exchange which 
allows him to get half of the recipient’s data and a shared secret. Then, using the second 
half of the recipient’s address and the shared secret, he calculates a one-time address. If 
we break down a Monero transaction, the detailed steps are as follows: 
 
1. Alice wants to send Bob a payment. She decrypts Bob’s address and gets Bob’s 
public key (A, B). 
2. She generates a random  𝑟 ∈ [1, 𝑙 − 1]  and calculates a one-time public key P: 
 
P = Hs (rA)G +B 
 
3. She uses P as a destination address for the output and inserts R = rG in the trans-
action. 
4. She sends the transaction. 
5. Bob checks all transactions with his private key (a, b) and calculates:  
 
P’ = Hs (aR)G +B 
 
6. If the transaction is intended for Bob, then aR = arG = rA and P’ = P 
7. Bob recovers the corresponding one-time private key x: 
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x = Hs (aR) +b ↔ P = xG 
 
Hs: a hash function {0, 1}*→ Fq 
l: a prime of the base point, l = 2252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493 
G: a base point in the elliptic curve G = (x, −
4
5
) 
a: a standard elliptic curve private key, a ∈ [1, l − 1] 
A: a standard elliptic curve public key, A = aG 
(a, b): a private user key pair of two private elliptic curve keys 
(a, B): a tracking key pair of private and public elliptic curve keys, B = bG and a≠b 
 
On top of stealth addresses, Monero implements ring signatures to avoid tracing trans-
action outputs back to their respective senders and receivers. A ring signature is a group 
of cryptographic signatures with one at least real participant which makes possible to 
have a number of possible signers without having to reveal which of the group members 
actually created the signature [48]. In Monero terms, the ring size is called mixin and intro-
duces a combinatorial explosion when applied to multiple transactions. For example, even 
with a mixin five, after 5 blockchain hops there will exist 3125 possible paths. 
 
Monero’s implementation of ring signatures uses four algorithms:  
 
(GEN, SIG, VER, LNK) 
  
GEN: Outputs an elliptic curve pair (P, x) and a public key I 
SIG: Uses a message m as an input along with a set S’ of public keys and a pair (Ps, xs) and 
outputs a signature s and a set of public keys S = S’∪[49] 
VER: Takes m, S and s as an input and outputs {true} or {false} 
LNK:  Takes set I = {Ii} and signature s as an input and outputs {indep} or {linked}  
 
The basic idea behind ring signatures is that a user creates a signature which can be veri-
fied by a group of public keys instead of just one public key allowing the signer to be 
indistinguishable from the other users participating in the ring. 
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 Finally, as of January 10th 2017, Monero activated the use of ring confidential trans-
actions, an idea originally proposed by Greg Maxwell who described confidential trans-
actions as a way to send Bitcoins with the amounts hidden [50]. Maxwell’s proposed model 
used a Pedersen commitment [51], a scheme that allows someone to choose a value while 
hiding it from the other participating parties. This commitment is binding in the sense that 
once committed to it, a party cannot change the chosen value. 
 Similar to Bitcoin, a transaction that is transmitted to the network, is subjected to 
validation checks and it is not verified until it becomes part of the blockchain. New trans-
actions that enter the network are added to a memory pool of unconfirmed transactions 
handled by each Monero node individually. However, when a new block is mined and 
contrary to how Bitcoin behaves, the node will not send the whole block. Instead it will 
send a block header and a list of the transaction hashes included in that block. The receiv-
ing node will examine its pool of unconfirmed transactions and will just ask the transmit-
ting peer for any transactions that it doesn’t already have. This results in largely reduced 
bandwidth requirements since the blocks are propagated differentially.  
Furthermore, instead of using a fixed block size, Monero utilizes a dynamic block 
size adjustment. More precisely, the minimum median block size is set to 60KB and the 
maximum block size at any given time is the maximum between 60KB and twice the 
median size of the last 100 blocks mined in the network. The purpose of this adjustment 
is that as the number of transactions increases, the block size will increase accordingly 
allowing some space scarcity to serve the increased demand. To prevent someone from 
spamming the network in order to artificially inflate the block size and overwhelm the 
network, Monero implements a quadratic penalty [52] to miners who create a block larger 
than the median size of the last 100 blocks and it is calculated as follows: 
 
P = Sb [(
𝐵
𝑀
) − 1]
2
 and S = Sb - P 
 
Where P is the penalty imposed on the miner, S the subside, Sb the base subsidy, B the 
current block size and M the median of the last 100 blocks.  
 Another feature that differentiates Monero from Bitcoin is the dynamic fees. Instead 
of using predetermined fees per KB of transaction, starting in version four of its block-
chain, Monero calculates fees dynamically. The fees are based on the block size of a past 
time window and the current block reward. The formula that calculates it is: 
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𝐹 =  (
𝑅
𝑅0
) (
𝑀0
𝑀
) 𝐹0 
 
Where R is the current block reward, R0 the reference block reward (10 XMR), M the 
block size limit as calculated by the dynamic block formula, M0  the minimum block size 
(60KB as previously mentioned) and finally F0 is a constant which acts as a sanity check 
and is set to 0.002 XMR. 
 
 
3.4.2 Disadvantages of Bitcoin as a C&C Communication Channel 
 
Contrary to common belief, Bitcoin is not a truly anonymous coin. All the transactions in 
the network involve pseudonymous addresses and a user’s transactions can easily be 
linked together. If somehow a transaction is linked to a user’s true identity, then all of his 
transactions will be exposed since all transfers are permanently and globally visible in the 
blockchain. Even if the user uses a different address every time (creating a new address 
is free and trivial), recent papers have shown ways on how to link a user’s different ad-
dresses and even his external identity [40] [53] [54].  
 Bitcoin in order to provide public verifiability, requires all of its transactions to be 
broadcasted in cleartext thus exposing a linkage between payees and payers to everyone. 
It is evident that this leads to very poor performance in the context of unlinkability and 
untraceability. Bitcoin’s community is aware of this issue, leading to much discussion on 
how to provide stronger anonymity. Some of the suggested solutions are: 
 
Mixing. It’s the most common one and it’s analogous to what mixes are in communica-
tions networks. In their most common form, mixers use a receiving address which re-
ceives coins from multiple users and then forwards them back in a random order back to 
a new address. However, mixers add a centralized point of failure in the network and in 
case they are compromised all the mixed coin’s transaction graphs will be revealed, so 
they are deemed inadequate for a reliable. 
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Coinjoin. A slightly improved method, originally proposed by Greg Maxwell [55], which 
can be applied in a decentralized manner. However, with Coinjoin a user can run into 
liquidity problems and is susceptible to Sybil attacks. Also, as Kristov Atlas showed, if 
the protocol is implemented incorrectly, the level of anonymity is diminished [56]. 
  
Finally, despite Bitcoin’s libertarian ideology, there have been many attempts re-
cently that indicate that in the near future the pressure from governments will probably 
lead to a stricter regulatory framework and censorship. An example of such attempt is the 
recent   press release  by the U.S. Department of Treasury which calls the Bitcoin com-
munity to block  two addresses that belong  to two Iran-based individuals [57]. Monero on 
the other hand is highly unlikely to experience a similar problem since the addresses are 
not publicly available and its community considers illegal activities as an unavoidable 
side-effect of strong privacy and anonymity. 
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4 Monero as a Solution  
Monero, as a platform, offers considerable advantages over Bitcoin with the most signif-
icant one being that it uses stealth addresses. As analyzed in 3.4.1 a user can publish his 
stealth address and sustain his anonymity since the destination address will be dynami-
cally computed by the sender. This address will never reach the blockchain thus consist-
ing him indistinguishable from the rest of the network and basically creating a huge ano-
nymity set. To further enhance its anonymity and prevent passive surveillance, Monero 
uses I2P as a network layer [58]. I2P was chosen over Tor because I2P doesn’t rely on 
directory services and also because of its symmetric design which allows more routers 
(basically every network participant is a router).  
 Furthermore, in Monero, nobody inspecting the blockchain is able to tell where 
the coins came from (even the recipient is unable to) and this is due to the use of the one-
time ring signatures. As shown in [59] an attacker would require 87% of the unspent trans-
action outputs in order to identify 1% of the total transactions. Additionally, by combining 
ring signatures, stealth addresses and ring confidential transactions, Monero achieves 
complete unlinkability and untraceability, an invaluable feature for any botnet operation.  
In this chapter we will propose a solution based on Monero’s blockchain that uses 
freely available software and we will demonstrate how realistic and practical such a so-
lution is. 
 
4.1 Operation of our Proposed Bot 
 
Prior to deploying the bots, the botmaster must create a Monero address which will be the 
address where all of his commands will be sent to. From this generated address, the bot-
master can derive three keys, a secret and a public viewkey and a private spend key. Also, 
the botmaster has to create a 128 bit long AES key [49] that will used to encrypt the com-
mands. The secret viewkey along with the AES key are embedded into the payload so 
that the bot will be able to decrypt any instructions sent by him.  
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  The second step is what we described in 2.2 as the initial infection and the sec-
ondary injection. For the purpose of this work, we can combine them into one since the 
infection technique that will be used is not important. As soon as a host is infected, a 
unique identifier is created that will allow the botmaster to distinguish the bots. This iden-
tifier can also contain encoded information regarding the victim’s operating system, hard-
ware information or even geolocation data, which are extremely valuable information for 
any botmaster. 
 In the third step, the bot is required to connect to the Monero network and begin prop-
agating transactions. For this step, we can follow two different approaches. The bot can 
either connect to a remote node that hosts the whole Monero blockchain or the bot can 
begin downloading the blockchain locally, hence becoming a full node for the Monero 
network. The advantage of the first approach is that the bot is synchronized with the net-
work almost immediately and becomes ready to receive instructions in a very short 
amount of time. Additionally, since Monero’s blockchain size as of today is around 
68GB, the synchronization with the network is a resource intensive procedure both stor-
age and bandwidth wise. However, this last issue will be probably resolved in the future 
by what is known as blockchain pruning, which will allow every peer on the network to 
start synchronizing from a specific block height. Therefore, if a bot is deployed in 2018, 
there is no need to download the whole blockchain from 2014, but instead download only 
the last blocks. A more fine-grained approach would also allow this block height to be 
calculated dynamically, by reading the timestamp of the host at the time of the infection, 
and automatically determine the most recent block. This way, the storage and bandwidth 
requirements will be kept at the bare minimum. The main disadvantage of the remote 
node approach is that we introduce a centralized element in an architecture which in all 
other aspects is completely decentralized. In any case, it is possible for both the remote 
and full node methods to be combined in such way that they become a failback for each 
other. If the synchronization with the network stops for some reason, the bot can switch 
to a remote node and vice versa. 
 In the final step, the botmaster issues commands to the botnet using Monero’s block-
chain as a C&C communication channel. To accomplish that, he creates a transaction and 
sends it to the address specified in the first step. This transaction contains a payment id 
which is a 32-byte hexadecimal string, encrypted with the private spend key, which can 
only be decrypted by the bots using the secret view key. 
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4.2 Testing Environment 
 
To evaluate our solution, we created a network with 4 machines. One played the role of 
botmaster’s main computer, the other one was running a daemon in RPC mode ready to 
receive commands from the botmaster and propagate them in the network and the last 
two computers are the bots which are connected to the Monero network. For demonstra-
tion purposes, we decided to run one computer as a full node and the other node was 
connected to a remote node.  
 
 
Figure 12 
Our testing environment consists of four virtual machines created in VirtualBox with 
their network adapters set in NAT mode. We used the latest Monero client version 
0.13.0.4 and for the testing script, Python 3.7 was used.  Also, instead of using livenet, 
we used testnet. In principal they are exactly the same, the latter however allows us to 
perform our tests without having to purchase Monero.  
First of all, we created an address which will act as the rendezvous point [15] for all 
bots. This address will be constantly monitored by the bots and will receive transactions 
that will contain commands issued by the botmaster. The keys and the address created for 
our demonstration, can be found at Table 2. 
We assume that the botmaster already has a Monero address with enough funds ready to 
be spent, even though a small amount is required as we will later see. 
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 Finally, we use the openssl library to generate our AES key which will be later used 
for the encryption of our commands. The command used for the creation of the key is the 
following: 
 
enc -aes-128-cbc -k dissertation -P -md sha1 
  
And the result is the following: 
 
   salt=4E9B6D2C10B7D59A 
 key=D8EEB29F92397A6C8F2EAFA6E560E7A2 
 iv =29340AD92F86721EEDF2103238536BFF 
 
 
Table 2 
Botnet Keys 
Address 9tog6A6dAeF34PEygcJYMs8yr5TskiwS8BidjtpHqyUrF4WgX84SxfwbzmbzxuhesvWxS
dMfT18tc6d2fmfij2QKSTeU4Fy 
Secret Viewkey 54697c65c7faee301b1e3b77d8c0647bb65cab850124b1443a52dff681450b0f 
Public Viewkey 10015444d8e006d13a3eb1e8947bddb31836e33d686b0d219b5c087560a94ce1 
AES Key D8EEB29F92397A6C8F2EAFA6E560E7A2 
 
 
4.3 Sending Commands 
 
We will be using the payment id (Pid) feature of Monero in order to enter C&C commands 
in a Monero transaction. Payment id is an arbitrary and optional message which can be 
attached by the sender to any transaction. According to the specifications of Monero’s 
protocol, it can be either a 32-byte unencrypted hexadecimal string or an 8-byte string, 
embedded into what is called an intergrated_address. The difference between the two 
types of payment ids is that the unencrypted ones are visible in a blockchain explorer, 
whereas the encrypted ones remain hidden. However, even when a payment id is visible, 
blockchain analysis cannot reveal any other information about the transaction or distin-
guish a Pid containing C&C commands from any other legit Pid. 
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 We will be using the 32-byte variant of the pid which offers us more bandwidth to 
include commands and its structure is depicted in Figure 13 
 
 
Figure 13 
 The first two bytes are used as an identifier of the type of the command that the bot 
has to execute, the next 28 bytes represent the host that the command will apply to and 
finally the last two bytes correspond to the port that will used. Some of the most common 
commands that bots use are Ping, Update, Download, DDOS, Screenshot, Scan, and Up-
load. Since we have two bytes available, we can assign each individual command to a hex 
value.  Some indicative commands are shown in Table 3, however we can assign up to 
65535 different commands given the two-byte capacity.  
 
 
Table 3 
Command Hex Values 
Start Ping 00 00 
Stop Ping 00 02 
HTTP Update 00 04 
HTTP Download 00 06 
FTP Download 00 08 
Start DDOS 00 0A 
Stop DDOS 00 0C 
Screenshot 00 0E 
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Start Scan 00 10 
Stop Scan 00 12 
Upload 00 14 
 
 The next 28 bytes are used to assign the host that the command applies to. The host 
field can either be a target, if the command is an attack, or it can be a server that hosts an 
updated payload. Finally, the port that will be used for the connection is determined by 
the last four bytes of the pid.  
4.4 Proof of Concept 
  
As we mentioned in 4.1, the first step for the botmaster is to connect to an RPC server 
which will relay the transactions to the network. In order to run the wallet in RPC mode, 
we issue the following command on the server: 
 
monero-wallet-rpc.exe --testnet --rpc-bind-port 18082 --wallet-file 
botnet --password "" --daemon-address monero-testnet.exan.tech:28081 
 
 
--testnet: Indicates that the wallet will synchronize with the testnet blockchain 
--rpc-bind-port: The port that the RPC server listens  
--wallet-file: The wallet containing the funds that will be used for the transaction 
--daemon-address:  The address of the remote node that the server will relay the trans-
actions in order to propagate to the rest of the network. 
 
 To ensure that communication with the server is possible, we can execute the fol-
lowing Python script: 
 
import requests 
import json 
 
 
class GetBalance(): 
 
    def __init__(self): 
        # Initial Connection 
        self.url = "http://localhost:18082/json_rpc" 
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        # standard json header 
        self.headers = {'content-type': 'application/json'} 
 
    def get_balance(self): 
        """return the wallet's balance""" 
 
        rpc_input = { 
            "method": "getbalance" 
        } 
 
        response = self.__do_rpc(rpc_input) 
 
        return response.json() 
 
    def execute(self): 
 
        example_functions = [self.get_balance] 
 
        for fun_obj in example_functions: 
            print(fun_obj.__name__ + "():\n" + fun_obj.__doc__) 
            json_result = fun_obj() 
            print(json_result, "\n") 
 
    def __do_rpc(self, rpc_input): 
 
        rpc_input.update({"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": "0"}) 
 
        # execute the rpc requrest 
        response = requests.post( 
            self.url, 
            data=json.dumps(rpc_input), 
            headers=self.headers) 
 
        return response 
 
 
if __name__ == "__main__": 
    sw = GetBalance() 
    sw.execute() 
 
The result is a JSON object like the following: 
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[{'address': '9wufLD1qpK5YoUchJ4FbFWFr4D22ZCtqD11ThpGwxN4j6eG-
hxvvdrJ2YRxdpNTURYraMoz8FkmhBnM9WfwNRe4zd9YiUtzu', 'balance': 
87508031318408}] 
 
Which means that the server we just connected to, has approximately 87 coins in its 
wallet’s balance, but more importantly accepts connections. 
 The next step is for the bots to start listening for new transactions. In order to do so, 
we are going to use the secret view key that we generated in 4.2. The command is the 
following: 
 
botnet_listener.exe --testnet --generate-from-view-key botnet --dae-
mon-address monero-testnet.exan.tech:28081 
 
 
--testnet: Indicates that the wallet will synchronize with the testnet blockchain 
--generate-from-view-key: Creates a wallet that has permission only to view incoming 
transactions  
--daemon-address:  The address of the remote node that the bot will listen for new trans-
actions. 
 
 
Figure 14 – The synchronized wallet, waiting for incoming transactions 
 
To simulate an actual command, let’s assume that we want to perform a DDoS attack 
against the web server that hosts the University’s website. According to Table 3, the cor-
responding hex code to start a DDoS attack is 00 0A. Furthermore, by converting 
ihu.edu.gr to a hexadecimal value we get 69 68 75 2e 65 64 75 2e 67 72 which is 10 bytes 
long. To ensure compliance with Monero’s protocol which requires a 32-byte pid, we pad 
this value with leading zeros which becomes 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
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00 00 00 00 69 68 75 2e 65 64 75 2e 67 72. Finally, ihu.edu.gr uses https, which means 
that the attack has to be against port 443 or 01 BB in hex. 
 We end up with 00 0A 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 69 68 
75 2e 65 64 75 2e 67 7201 BB as our pid number. However, as we mentioned before, the 
pid will be visible in the blockchain, and since converting a hexadecimal to text is some-
thing trivial, we need to encrypt it before transmitting it. 
 For this purpose, we are going to use the AES key that we created in 4.2. At this point 
it is worth noticing that AES-128-CBC supports 16-byte blocks, hence we are guaranteed 
that we will get a 32-byte output as long as we provide a 32-byte input. We encrypt the 
pid in OpenSSL and we end up with a final value of 9c d5 00 fe 23 40 05 35 9a 30 bb 70 
ed f5 27 32 4a db d1 4f f9 8e e7 f2 40 42 b0 3d 02 61 97 1e, which is our final pid. 
 The botmaster can now issue his C&C command with following Python script: 
 
import requests 
import json 
import os 
 
 
def main(): 
 
    # wallet is running in RPC mode 
    url = "http://<server_address>:18082/json_rpc" 
 
    # standard json header 
    headers = {'content-type': 'application/json'} 
 
    destination_address = 
"9tog6A6dAeF34PEygcJYMs8yr5TskiwS8BidjtpHqyUrF4WgX84SxfwbzmbzxuhesvWxS
dMfT18tc6d2fmfij2QKSTeU4Fy" 
 
    # send specified xmr amount to the given destination_address 
    recipents = [{"address": destination_address, 
                  "amount": 1000000}] 
 
    payment_id = 
"9cd500fe234005359a30bb70edf527324adbd14ff98ee7f24042b03d0261971e" 
 
    # simplewallet' procedure/method to call 
    rpc_input = { 
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        "method": "transfer", 
        "params": {"destinations": recipents, 
                   "payment_id" : payment_id} 
    } 
 
    # add standard rpc values 
    rpc_input.update({"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": "0"}) 
 
    # execute the rpc request 
    response = requests.post( 
         url, 
         data=json.dumps(rpc_input), 
         headers=headers) 
 
    # print the payment_id 
    print("#payment_id: ", payment_id) 
 
    # pretty print json output 
    print(json.dumps(response.json(), indent=4)) 
 
 
if __name__ == "__main__": 
    main() 
     
The transaction enters the memory pool of the blockchain and we can almost imme-
diately see it in the bot’s wallet by issuing the show_transfers in command. We immedi-
ately also see it in a public explorer but since pid is encrypted, it does not raise any sus-
picions. 
 
 
Figure 15 – The result of the show_transfers in on the bot’s side 
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Figure 16 – The transaction as shown in a blockchain explorer 
 
From this point, the bot can apply the reverse technique and retrieve the C&C com-
mand. More specifically, it decodes the pid of the received transaction using the AES key 
and then breaks down the resulting hex according to the structure of Figure 13.  
 
4.5 Cost of Operation 
 
In our proposal, the total expenses can be pinpointed down to two factors. The first one 
is the amount sent by the botmaster to the address of the bots and the second one is the 
fee that the network charges every time a transaction is made. Since the amount that is 
sent during the transaction goes back to a wallet controlled by the botmaster, we will only 
examine the cost of the fees. 
Even though in Monero the fee is dynamically calculated, we can have a quite good 
estimate by studying a blockchain explorer. As shown in Figure 16, the transaction size 
was 2.66 kilobytes and the total fee paid was 0.00014 XMR, which with today’s exchange 
rates amounts to 0.005€. However, we have to keep in mind that our test was performed 
on testnet, where blocks are usually empty thus significantly increasing the fee per kB. 
Examining a livenet blockchain explorer, reveals that the cost of a similarly sized trans-
action would have been undoubtedly lower. More specifically, at the time of the transac-
tion of our test, a 2.65kB transaction on livenet would have cost 0.00006 XMR, or 
0.00222€.   
In the case of Bitcoin, a typical transaction with one input and two outputs is around 
250 bytes. However, although the average transaction size in Bitcoin is lower, that doesn’t 
apply to the transaction fees as well. The cost for a similar transaction at the time of 
writing, would have been around 0.001 BTC or 2.8€. 
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 If we take into consideration the fact that our proposal does not require any other 
expenditure in infrastructure, specialized software or maintenance costs, it becomes ap-
parent that, at least from a logistics point of view, Monero’s blockchain as a C&C mech-
anism is a very tempting solution.   
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5 Conclusions 
 
In this dissertation, we tried to establish a framework for evaluating the challenges of 
maintaining a botnet from a botmaster’s perspective. We examined the evolution of bot-
nets in a historical context and we presented the most common architectures used by them. 
Then, we examined the most popular techniques used for their mitigation, something that 
subsequently rises a challenge for every botmaster, hence leading malware authors in 
search of new opportunities and developments. 
 We presented a solution based on Monero’s blockchain and demonstrated through a 
proof of concept that such a solution is not only feasible but, also considering all the 
advantages that Monero offers in terms of anonymity and unlinkability, very hard to coun-
termeasure. It offers a completely decentralized platform and contrary to Zombiecoin’s 
implementation, it is almost impossible to censor or trace through blockchain analysis. 
Furthermore, it offers extreme resilience to traditional takedown attempts and it is very 
cost effective. 
 We strongly believe that botnets based on blockchains are going to become more 
popular in the near future and they are going to be a handful for government and organi-
zations, especially if implemented correctly. 
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